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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court err in ruling that Oregon law would apply a 
"presumption of payment" to the savings account at issue? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of binding case law is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2005 UT 
21, If 7,116 P.3d 259. 
PRESERVATION: This issue was argued in connection with the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, R. 81-89, 99-109, 129-130, and at trial, T. 87-89. 
ISSUE NO. 2: In the alternative, did the district court err in ruling that, if the 
presumption of payment rule does apply, the plaintiffs evidence did not rebut the 
presumption? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Under Oregon law, "[a] rebuttable presumption is one 
that may be overcome if the party against whom the presumption is directed submits 
probative evidence that the nonexistence of its presumed fact is more probable than its 
existence." Redler v. Redler, 330 Or. 51, 996 P.2d 963, 968 (2000). Because the Bank 
offered no contrary evidence as to the disposition of the bank account at issue, this Court's 
review is not a comparison or weighing of the evidence, or a review of findings of fact 
based upon such a comparison. Rather, the issue for review is whether the plaintiff adduced 
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sufficient evidence to overcome an evidentiary presumption implied by law. That is 
analogous to the review of a trial court's finding that evidence is insufficient to go to a jury. 
Accordingly, the decision should be reviewed de novo. Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 8, 
116P.3d290. 
PRESERVATION: This issue was argued in connection with the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, R. 81, 99-102, 129-134, and at trial, T. 85-88, 161-168, 180-
181. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no dispositive constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff George B. Handy brought this action on March 8, 2004, to recover money 
in a savings account opened by defendant U. S. Bank's predecessor. (R. 1.) On June 24, 
2005, U. S. Bank filed a motion with summary judgment, arguing that the claims were 
barred by the "presumption of payment" doctrine, laches, and Oregon's Uniform 
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (escheatment statute). (R. 75.) Plaintiff filed an 
opposing memorandum (R. 93), and the Bank filed a reply. (R. 124.) 
The trial court heard oral argument on August 24, 2005, and issued a 
Memorandum Decision on September 7, 2005, denying U. S. Bank's motion. (R. 148-
149.) The Bank asserted, and the court agreed, that Oregon law should be applied to the 
dispute because the passbook was issued by an Oregon bank. (R. 81, 149; see also R. 263 
13.) 
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The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to the 
rebuttable presumption of presumption, ruling that "the Plaintiffs evidence is sufficient 
to overcome a presumption of payment." (R. 150.) It further denied the motion based 
upon laches, concluding that "[w]hether the plaintiff had full knowledge of the passbook 
as well as whether it was the Plaintiffs delay that prejudiced the Defendant are questions 
for the trier of fact." (R. 151 and id ("Whether the prejudice to the Defendant was 
caused by Plaintiffs delay or through Defendant's own actions is a factual question")). 
With respect to the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, the trial court 
held that "[t]he fact of whether the account escheated remains in issue." (R. 152.) 
The case was tried to the bench on February 6, 2006. (R. 230.) At the conclusion 
of the trial, the court noted that the facts of the case were basically not in dispute. (T. 
159, lines 16-22.) The dispositive issue, therefore, became burdens of proof and an 
evidentiary presumption. The court took the matter under advisement, and issued a 
Memorandum Decision on March 7, 2006. (R. 248.) 
The trial court found that the Bank had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove 
the affirmative defense that the funds had escheated to the state, noting: "The only 
evidence at trial was that this account did not escheat to either Oregon or Utah." (R. 249.) 
The court also found that the Bank had not met its burden of proving the affirmative 
defense of laches, stating: "The Defendant had the burden to establish, if possible, some 
fact or circumstance that would have placed Mr. Handy on constructive notice that the 
funds were being threatened sooner than October, 2003. Defendant has not made that 
required showing." (R. 250.) 
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The trial court's final ruling was the basis for entering judgment in favor of the 
defendant. The court ruled that, under Oregon law, "[a]fter twenty years, an obligation is 
presumed to have been paid," and that "[t]he presumption of payment from lapse of time 
applies to bank deposits." (R. 250; see also R. 261, ffl] 3-4.) The court measured the 
twenty-year period from the date of the initial deposits (1971), and therefore concluded 
that "a period of 32 years" had lapsed. Accordingly, the court presumed that the deposits 
had been paid, and shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff. (R. 250.) 
The trial court stated that the presumption of payment "is a strong one and the 
evidence to rebut it must be satisfactory and convincing." (R. 251.) The court then 
summarized the plaintiffs evidence as follows, finding it insufficient: 
[T]he passbook shows the deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require 
presentation of the passbook. "George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name 
appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has not made any withdrawals and has not 
authorized any other person to make withdrawals. There is no other competent 
evidence that these deposits have not been paid. 
Statement of Facts 
As the trial court noted, the facts in this case were not in dispute. (T. 159.) Out of 
the various facts, however, one single fact is dispositive of this appeal: Mr. Handy first 
made demand for payment of the savings account in 2003. (R. 260.) Under Oregon law, 
the twenty-year period required to invoke a presumption of payment did not begin to run 
until that date, if it applied at all. (See pp. 17-18, infra.) All other facts are immaterial to 
the disposition of the case. However, to provide an overall picture of the events, the 
evidence at trial included the following: 
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Plaintiff George B. llandv. l.su., has practiced law in the Ogden area for fifty-
seven years. /nr 1A 1:—" • ^loi,i.i -iMJ.; 
puNNbunk i mli in.'ii mi liiiiii nil i Iht passbook was under the name "George B. 
Handy, Trustee," Account No, 403111-8, and was issued in 1971 by the Portland branch 
ofthe United States National Bank of Oregon. ( Inal l 'xh. I Addendum Iwl1, i 
••'.-.. I IK1 passbth4 shows lh< I-vllowiiu1 *li:posits: , •.--.. 
July 29, 1971 $50,000 
>.. August 9, ' $2? • 0' 
':,,,. Aunusl I • •' $25,000 
August 23, 1971 $25,000 
. September - 1 . $25,01111 
Mr. Handy was unaware that the passbook was in his possession, and did not know 
how he came to bi in possessmn mil im iill n n seeing the passbook InTnie. 
( 1 . 1142, lines 3-21; R. 259, ffl[ 940.) As he puzzled over it, Mr. Handy recalled a client 
for whom he was providing legal services in 10" i.
 r idiard A. Anders** i. .\;; Anderson 
•*••»* n» * t -M y\
 %*-, • * -Hfc ea faka I>epCo). 
In 1971, He was in the midst of legal disputes in several states, including Oregon, and Mr. 
Handy had traveled with him u> Oregon u> discuss his business i^uc: u o i ,s 
there I Illii I land ' itrallnl liuil ;il ainiind lli.it same 1inu\ Mr. Anderson asked if he could 
place money in a trust account in Mr. Handy's name. \T TTamh staled that he had no 
objection. (See T. 28-33, 40.) ' ' 
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On January 2, 1972, three and a half months after the last deposit in Account 
403111-8, Richard Anderson died in a plane crash. (T. 32-33, lines 24-9.) Mr. Handy 
feels an obligation to collect the money in the account, and to attempt to return it to the 
person(s) he believes to be its rightful owner(s). He does not seek to gain personally from 
this lawsuit. (T. 33, lines 10-18; T. 44-45, lines 20-11.) 
In 1997, the U.S. National Bank of Oregon merged with First Bank National 
Association, ultimately resulting in the formation of an entity called U. S. Bank National 
Association, the named defendant in this action. (T. 16-17, lines 19-12; T. 34, lines 6-8.) 
Except where otherwise noted, U. S. Bank and its predecessors are collectively referred to 
herein as "the Bank." 
A bank passbook was a small book that constituted a customer's only record of his 
or her deposit account. (See pp. 12-16, infra.) Customers would present the book to the 
bank to be updated when conducting transactions, such as deposits or withdrawals. (T. 
91-92, lines 25-10.) The Passbook states, under the heading "About Your Savings 
Account": 
For your protection, all withdrawals from this account require presentation of this 
passbook. Please notify us at once should you lose your passbook. 
* * * 
It is not necessary to bring in your passbook on the first of each quarter for the 
entry of interest. We credit your account automatically with your interest on these 
dates and it can be entered in your passbook at any time thereafter. 
Addendum Exh. A, cover. 
Under "Rules and Regulations Governing Savings Accounts," the Passbook states: 
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(1111: SAVINGS PASSBOOK) 
Rule 2. A pre-numbered passbook shall be issued for each sax \ \u 
deposits made by or for the account of the depositor will b ,u in the 
passbook at the time they are made, or as soon thereafter as the j >k shall be 
presented for such purpose. The balance shown in the passbook to the credit of the 
depositor is subject to correction to accord with the Bank's records. 
Should the savings passbook be lost, destroyed or fraudulently obtained from any 
depositor, immediate notice must be given the office of the Bank at which the 
account is carried. After such notice, if satisfactory explanation be made and bond 
of indemnity be given in a form approved by the Bank's officers, the amount to the 
credit of the depositor will be paid to such depositor or a new K *k x\ ill be issued 
therefor. 
* * * ' • • • 
( W I T H D R A W A L S ) 
Rule 6. The passbook mus t be presented to the Bank \\ hen a i\ ltbilruvv i ' "s "IKHJI 
Withdrawals may be made personally, the depositor being required to sign a 
receipt for the amount of the withdrawal , or by order in writing satisfactorily 
authenticated, or by power of attorney, duly authenticated. 
M , second and llmil I iiiiiiiimlu'inl I irnr _ . • . • . 
Upon discovering the passbook, Mr. I landv promptly contacted the Bank. The 
Bank did not dispute the authenticity oi the passbouk. and ^ k n o w l e d g e s that it is a record 
•^  •-*•• Nonetheless , it refused Mr. Handy ' s 
demand for payment of the balance shown in the passbook plus accumulated interest. 
Handy never made any wi lhduwa l s , ncvci a u l h o n / a l air me \ IM '" i.ake 
withdrawals, never signed an aflidin if o i a lost passbook, and never received any money 
from the account. ( 1 . 26-27, lines 19-8; R. 1 "" N; .-Mthouuh it was possible for someone 
to make a withdrawal without a passDcuw UIAICI ^oiiic >,.• . . <MW^ - *>. - • -• 2, 
7 
T. 123-124, lines 13-7) (at least as of 1980, when the Bank's trial witnesses became 
employed there), it was not common. (T. 123, lines 9-18.)1 Additionally, if more than 
one person had been an authorized signer on the account, both names ordinarily would 
have appeared on the passbook itself. (T. 119-121, lines 8-4.) 
Beginning in 1980, the Bank decided to discontinue offering passbook accounts, 
and instead to offer only "statement accounts," for which customers would receive 
regular statements of their account. (T. 91, lines 18-24.) Mr. Handy never received any 
notice of the change, or any statements on the account. (T. 27-28, lines 16-7.) 
As far as the Bank's witnesses knew (they did not become employed at the Bank 
until years later), the Bank began to computerize its records in 1974. (T. 95, lines 3-5.)2 
Data regarding an account's ownership, address, social security numbers, and balances 
were fully computerized by 1980. Records were also maintained on microfiche. (T. 91, 
lines 11-17.) 
The Bank elected not to retain any records relating to the Account. There was no 
requirement that the records be destroyed after a particular period of time; it was solely 
The Bank's witness did not know what the Bank's policy was with respect to 
restrictions on withdrawals without a passbook (whether there was a dollar limit, whether 
an account could be closed out entirely without a passbook, etc.). (T. 124-125, lines 3-8.) 
The Bank did not call any witnesses who worked at the Bank when the deposits were 
made. The Bank's two trial witnesses were hired in 1980, nine years after the account 
was opened. (T. 90-91, lines 21-2; T. 127-128, lines 12-3.) The other Bank witness who 
testified never worked at the Oregon bank. (T. 73, lines 4-7.) The Bank made no effort 
to investigate which bank employees' initials appeared in the passbook, or to call them as 
witnesses. (T. 79, lines 2-24; T. 103-104, lines 2-18.) 
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the Bank's decision to do so. (R. 71, ffi[ 8-10, R. 7(.\ 1 ' 11\ lines I" 18.) The Bank 
acknowledges that, •without such records, there is no way to prove that the account was 
ever paid uui HI I i|| I I 
At trial, the Bank acknowledged that it had no evidence thai A count 4 0 ? ] ' I ? 
had been converted to a statement account, or that the monex in (he . .^couni ... , cr 
i ) Instead, the 
Bank relied entirely upon a twenty-year "presumption of payment," whu «i would shift the 
defendant's normal burden nl prooi on die atunnaiivc Jck ; , . c ofpayme* , , ..UI:H1L 
uui ,5 . ; : "!* Imntiff has failed to meet its 
burden of proof, specificalh with the presumption of payment rule that is applicable and 
relevant in the Stau <»i Oregon and- aju.i.. di.u ,u.„ M.II. I 
presi -. • ' • • ' 'ocs bevond ?() vears . . . . T. 89, lines 20-
22) (Cour* - \ oil"- reiving upon strict!) \Uc Oregon law that says: Hey. after 20 years, 
no activity, if s presumes ... ; *. , 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Savings accounts are unique U- the banking industry. With the encouragement of 
banks, customers oilen kit u JIIOIU1'. H savings accnunl I i nmn\ \c;n: fully expecting 
that it will be there when they eventually call for it. At the time that iAccount 403 111-8 
was opened, the only record of such account that the bank customer would have receixed 
mi! Ilie passhnnl, ill i 111 \\III111 IIi \\n\ umsideied tiiinui tarn n IIUIIIH r nil Ihr status (if the 
account - i.e., the transactions that had occurred. It was for that reason that presentation 
of the passbook was expressly required before withdrawals could be made. 
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In the court below, the Bank acknowledged that it had no evidence of what 
happened to Account 403111-8. It speculated that the account had been switched to a 
statement account, but there was no record of that, and Mr. Handy had never received any 
statements. It speculated that someone else might have withdrawn the money, but 
conceded that such an occurrence would have been unusual, and again there was no 
evidence of it. Thus, Mr. Handy had prima facie evidence (the passbook) that the money 
was owing, and the Bank had no contrary evidence. Ordinarily, therefore, Mr. Handy 
would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Bank's argument that, in the absence of actual evidence of payment, it was 
nonetheless entitled to a presumption of payment is directly contradicted by Oregon 
Supreme Court precedent. Under Oregon law, no presumption of payment period is 
triggered until a debt has matured, and a cause of action against the defendant has 
accrued. A cause of action against a bank on a deposit account, in turn, does not accrue 
until the claimant has made a demand and the bank has refused to pay. Courts and 
commentators are virtually unanimous on that point, noting that a bank has no obligation 
to pay - i.e., the debt does not "mature" - until the plaintiff asks for the money at the 
bank's place of business, unlike a traditional debtor, who has an obligation to track down 
the creditor and pay the debt immediately. 
The trial court thus erred in measuring the presumption of payment period from the 
initial deposit in 1971, instead of the time of plaintiff s demand and the bank's refusal in 
2003. Additionally, the trial court's application of the presumption of payment to savings 
10 
accounts is inconsistent with the Oregon Supreme Court's recognition that evidentiary 
presumptions should only apply when it makes sense undci inc circumstances. 
does not make sense to apply a presumption of payment to savings accounts, considering 
that customers are encouraged and expected to leave money m them lor .:ideiiniLc periods 
: •. uvonk nn thereb1- make it 
difficult to defend a claim, the consequences of thai decision lie with the bank. 
1 x
-~c alternative, even o .\ presumption of paymen. ,._; ap, nee. i 
. ntilT*. rvii* ;> -• •• ''tiiMrf • - • ! - . • This issue does not involve 
a weighing of evidence, kaiher, under Oregon law, the presumption "does not arise" at 
all if evidence explaining the delay or supporting non-pa\ i..c- ;
 s . **\*K 
•"'• ' • ^session when bank iules vvould have required a io be 
presented in order to make a withdrawn T; .vas uneontroverted that Mr. Handy never 
made any withdrawals, nor authorized anyone e i ^ .- . - - ^ . n . - . s 
off..M -. meone else might have withdrawn the money would have 
been, according to the Bank's own witnesses, unusual. 
In sum, the 111. i I i iKiiiiill i kail) urn il In • 111111 iiiiiii i pUMimpliim nl pa\ inrnl In a 
savings account on which demand for payment was not made unt. 2 jed, 
persuasive authority suggests that presumption* of payment shin.id i ot apply ai «ii to 
depo :. ' n 




I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A PRESUMPTION 
OF PAYMENT APPLIED TO THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AT ISSUE. 
A. The presumption of payment is inapplicable in this case because the twenty-
year presumption period was not triggered until Mr. Handv's demand in 2003. 
Savings accounts are "peculiar to [the] banking business." Nathan Newmark, The 
Law Relating to Bank Deposits (1888); Michie on Banks and Banking (2002), § 308, p. 
415 (noting "peculiarities" of the bank-depositor relationship). Unlike a typical debtor-
creditor relationship, instead of owing money in the classic sense, a Bank is being 
entrusted with money. The customer not only expects but desires that the bank retain the 
money until the customer calls for it. 
In Oregon, funds placed in a savings account are referred to as a "deposit liability." 
Blakeley v. First National Bank of the Dalles, 151 Or. 655, 51 P.2d 1034, 1037, 1040 
(1935). Depositors often leave money in savings accounts for many years, assuming that 
it will be available to them when demand is eventually made. "A depositor of funds into 
a bank savings account is entitled to believe that the deposit is entirely safe, that funds 
will be indefinitely available, and that no demand need be made and no action need be 
taken to protect the right to obtain those funds at any time the passbook is presented." 
Michie, supra, at p. 416. 
As one opinion cited by the Oregon Supreme Court stated rather colorfully: 
When A. puts his money with B., a banker, he does it with the purpose of leaving it 
there for a day, a year, or many years. It may be it is not put where moth and rust 
do not corrupt and thieves do not break through and steal; but A. feels safe, as 
things run in this world. He may go into a far country, up and down and to and 
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fro, resting on the assurance that his money will be his on his retui n; B. having the 
• use, the interest, of it as his 
Missouri f'aciuc t. < •• . i i)fUttu:nuu .\u!n~>tu4, iintik. _. ; . . . ' . . • ' . . ' * . 
(1908^ • , . • - »
 ir.K;ihl , r , „ 7 / / ( . / . _ 172 Or. 434, 138 P.2d 613 
(1943). See also Haines v. First National Bank of Roseburg, 89 Or. 42, 172 P. 505 
(1918) .• ?s common knowledge that individuals leave nionev on depnsil in hanks loi 
long periods of t ime beyond the six years prescribed in which an action for money may be 
instituted"). 
•. . In this case, tl le Bank reinfoi ce d the expectation that no affin nati \ e act nee d 1:> z 
taken to preserve funds by stating in its passbook that the customer did not have to come 
"• \ receive interest or reconcile the account, unlike other banks wNch did require 
of Baltimore, 132 A. 598 (Md. App. 1926) (passbook required the presentation of the 
passbook at specific intervals for interest and balanci^^ 
during the interim: 
With respect to a bank deposit, "[t]he transaction is in reality for the benefit and 
convenience of the depositor, and while the relation of debtor and creditor exists, 
and the bank has the use of the money for commercial gain, it assumes no further 
obligation than to pay the amount received when it shall be demanded at its 
banking house," 
Penagos v. Capital , ^ , \ A . „ ;ii;ig Li^oit v. 
G y nu if/ Cit) > State R ink, 128 I< m a 275, 1l n w « 7 7 779 778 (1905) *< • - '* > '- It i >. Gi < M it 
American Savings & Loan Assoc, 572 TN.l 2d 11 1 *\ 1118 Mil. App. \w* \ ("Si would not 
be equitable to allow defendant to argue that demand must be made within a reasonable 
time, because banks and savings and loans advertise to coax people to deposit money in a 
savings account for their newborn child or grandchild. After people deposit their money 
for their children, they leave the money in the account to accumulate interest until the 
child is 18 or 20 years old and withdraws the money"). 
Viewing it practically, the longer the bank retains the money undisturbed, the 
better it is for the bank. If it has been allowed to reap extraordinary gains from the 
funds of a customer, because it has been allowed to retain them undisturbed for the 
unwonted space of eight, ten, or twelve years, this would seem to be no just cause 
for allowing it to add the still more enormous gain of a complete appropriation of 
the whole sum. If the business of the institution is properly conducted, the 
depositor's balance will remain for any period as an open and live credit on the 
books of the bank; and therefore the depositor's draft for his principal, or any part 
of it, could never operate as an injurious surprise, as a like demand might do 
between individuals under ordinary circumstances. Such seems clearly to be the 
fair reason of the matter. The legal arguments and authorities which sustain it 
seem scarcely less than conclusive. 
John T. Morse, Jr., A Treatise on the Law of Banks and Banking (5th Ed. 1917), § 292, 
pp. 598-99. 
In addition to the desire to leave money in a savings account for investment 
purposes, banks were aware during the passbook era that savings accounts often became 
dormant for long periods of time for other reasons. In 1970, for example, the general 
counsel for the United States Savings and Loan League wrote: 
Perhaps the majority of dormant accounts result from either the saver's 
forgetfulness or the saver's death. It happens quite frequently, for example, that a 
savings account holder forgets that he has an account at a particular association. A 
move to another community, a change of office location (either his own or the 
association's), loss or destruction of personal records, press of business, illness and 
many other factors contribute to this forgetfulness, and thus a dormant account is 
created. The second major factor contributing to dormancy is the death of a saver 
and the failure of his estate representatives to locate his savings account. 
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William C. Prather, Savings Accounts, American Savings and Loan Institute Press: 1970, 
p. 542. 
Account 403111-8 was the type of savings account known as a "passbook" savings 
account. Such accounts "have become something of a dinosaur." Barkley Clark and 
Barbara Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards § 19.02[2][O]. 
However, from the earliest days of the banking industry until the mid-1980s, they were 
the primary form of savings account in the United States. As a leading scholar in the 
early twentieth century wrote, "The custom is probably universal in this country for every 
depositor with a bank to have his bank-book, so called. In England the same thing is 
called a 'passage-book' or 'pass-book.' It is hardly necessary to describe anything so 
familiarly known." Morse, supra, at § 291, p. 548. 
With passbook savings accounts, customers presented the passbook to the bank 
when depositing or withdrawing funds. In contrast to the typical account of today, the 
passbook was the customer's only record of the account; no statements of the account 
were sent to passbook customers. See Clark, supra, § 19.02[2][P] (exception in federal 
regulations for account statements on passbook accounts "is based on the theory that 
consumers do not expect periodic statements for their passbook savings accounts"). 
For that reason, the passbook was considered to be primary evidence as to the state 
of the customer's account: 
It will be seen that the chief value of the book is that the depositor may have a 
species of check upon the bank, and may use it as evidence upon the occurrence of 
any dispute and lawsuit. The entries in the bank-book, made by the proper officer, 
bind the bank as admissions. Especially the balancing of the book is conclusive 
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upon the bank, in the same manner as an account stated. . . . It is prima facie 
evidence against the bank, and binds it like any other form of acknowledgment or 
receipt. 
Morse, supra, at § 291(a), (b), pp. 548-59. See also Michie, supra, at § 309, p. 452 ("The 
object of a passbook was to inform the depositor from time to time of the condition of his 
account as it appeared upon the books of the bank. . . . It not only enabled him to discover 
errors to his prejudice, but supplied evidence in his favor in the event of litigation or 
dispute with the bank"); id. at pp. 455-56 (passbook constitutes "prima facie evidence that 
the bank received the amount entered; that is, it raised a presumption that the deposit was 
made. The passbook was prima facie evidence of the state of the depositor's account and 
entries therein were admissible in evidence as to the amount due the depositor"). 
The trial court thus correctly concluded that possession of the passbook by Mr. 
Handy was prima facie evidence that the sums in the account had been deposited and not 
paid out. Ordinarily, that would have entitled Mr. Handy to judgment as a matter of law, 
because the bank had no evidence that the account was actually paid, a defense on which 
it bore the burden of proof under Oregon law. Kahl v. Pool, 47 Or.App. 43, 613 P.2d 
1078, 1081 (1980) ("Payment must be pleaded and proved by the party claiming it"), 
citing Pickett v. Pickett, 21A Or. 135, 544 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1976). 
In this case, however, the Bank argued that it was entitled to a presumption of 
payment due to the passage of time. Under the common law, payment of a debt will be 
presumed after twenty years, in the absence of evidence explaining the delay. Beekman v. 
Hamlin, 20 Or. 352, 25 P. 672 (1891) (Beekman II). The underlying rationale for the 
presumption is that "a person naturally desires to possess and enjoy his own, and that an 
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unexplained neglect to enforce an alleged right for a long period casts suspicion upon the 
existence of the right itself." Id. at 672. 
In Oregon, the presumption of payment is an evidentiary tool that shifts the normal 
burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff. The Oregon Supreme Court has 
explained: 
The effect of the presumption of payment, arising from lapse of time, is to change 
the burden of proof from the debtor to the creditor. Within 20 years, the law 
presumes that the debt has remained unpaid, and the burden is on the debtor to 
prove payment, but after 20 years, "the creditor is bound to show by something 
more than his bond that the debt has not been paid; and this he may do, because the 
presumption raises only a prima facie case against him." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The twenty-year presumption of payment period does not begin to run until a debt 
has matured and a cause of action against the debtor has arisen. Thompson v. Larsen, 118 
Or. 421, 247 P. 139, 140 (1926) (measuring period of time for presumption of payment 
from when "the cause of action accrued"); Beekman v. Hamlin, 19 Or. 383, 24 P. 195, 
195-96 (1890) (Beekman I) (the "common law presumption of payment attaches from the 
time when the cause of action arises . . . ."). See also 70 C.J.S. Payment § 86 
(presumption of payment applies to "a period of 20 years after maturity of a debt . . . 
Ordinarily, the period necessary to raise a presumption of payment from lapse of time 
does not begin to run until the debt is mature and a cause of action has therefore 
accrued"); Henry J. Bailey & Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks § 15.14 
(common-law presumption is that payment was made "if more than twenty years have 
passed since the debt matured"). 
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The Oregon Supreme Court has consistently held that a cause of action against a 
bank on a deposit account does not accrue until demand for payment has been made and 
refused. See First National Bank of Portland v. Connolly, 172 Or. 434, 138 P.2d 613 
(1943) ("if a deposit is general and not evidenced by any regular certificate of deposit or 
other writing fixing the time of payment, the statute of limitations does not commence to 
run in favor of the bank until demand and refusal"), citing 5 Michie, Banks and Banking 
679, § 354, Blakeley v. First National Bank of the Dalles, 151 Or. 655, 51 P.2d 1034, 
1037, 1040 (1935), Haines v. First National Bank of Roseburg, 89 Or. 42, 172 P. 505, 
508 (1918), and Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Continental National Bank, 212 Mo. 505, 111 
S.W. 574(1908).3 
Because a cause of action does not accrue against a bank on a deposit account until 
demand has been made and refused, the twenty-year period required to impose a 
presumption of payment did not begin to run in this case until 2003, when Mr. Handy first 
demanded payment of the account. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to shift the 
burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff, and, in the absence of any evidence of 
payment, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
3
 It is not coincidental that the triggering event for the presumption of payment period and 
the statute of limitations is the same (accrual of a cause of action). "Historically, the 
rebuttable presumption of payment originated in equity by analogy to the English statute 
of limitations as early as the statute of Henry VIII, C.F. (1540), and was later made part of 
the common law." Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 N.J. 220, 760 A2d 509, 511 
(1996). 
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This basic principle is made clear by the Missouri Pacific case that was cited by 
the Oregon Supreme Court in Connolly. In Missouri Pacific, the Missouri Supreme Court 
conducted a thorough (and pithy) analysis of when a cause of action accrues against a 
bank on a deposit account. Lacking precedent in its own state, the court turned to "the 
inherent reason of the thing and the persuasive authority of precedents in other 
jurisdictions establishing the general law." Id. at 577. 
The Missouri Supreme Court first noted that it is error for a court to operate under 
the assumption that the bank-depositor relationship is like a typical debtor-creditor 
relationship: 
Courts are fond of saying that the relation between depositor and banker is merely 
that of debtor and creditor. If that formula precisely expressed all there was of the 
truth, then the statute of limitations would be applied to the relation of depositor 
and banker precisely as it is between debtor and creditor. But the formula may be 
said to be somewhat of a fiction of the law—a formula used for want of a better 
and springing from the poverty of our language in expressing nice shades of 
thought. It is the truth, but not all there is of it. For example, a bank is sometimes 
viewed as a mere custodian of the depositor's fund; so it is trite learning that a 
bank is under no obligation to pay until demand made. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Application of ordinary debtor-creditor principles is not appropriate in the context 
of a bank's liability on a deposit, the court wrote, because a bank is not a debtor in the 
ordinary sense: 
It need not like a common debtor, run about and hunt up its creditor, and pay him 
whenever and wherever found. To the contrary (Mahomet going to the mountain) 
it pays only over its counter. The deposit, then, not being due till demand is made, 
the demand and refusal to pay set the statute running.... 
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The notion that a depositor could lose his money due to the passage of time before 
a demand had even been made has been anathema since long before our present system of 
laws, the court wrote: 
Was it not shrewdly said in very olden time: "Wherefore then gavest not thou my 
money into the bank, that at my coming I might have required mine own," etc? 
Luke, 19:23, q. v. But would it not be a startling and far reaching proposition to 
announce that B., the banker, has not only the usufruct of, but by the mere flux of 
time has absorbed, the very corpus of A.'s deposit; thus bringing B. within the 
description of the austere man, of whom it was said in the authority, supra: "Thou 
takest up that thou layedst not down, and reapest that thou didst not sow"? The 
fact that no case involving that proposition is in our reports may well be due to the 
consensus of opinion in the business world that the proposition runs counter to 
good banking and the good sense of the thing. 
/</. at578. 
The court then turned to a leading treatise on bank law, Morse on Banks and 
Banking, which observed that, when money is deposited into an account, an implied 
contract arises "modified by the clear legal understanding that the money shall be 
forthcoming to meet the order of the creditor whenever that order shall be properly 
presented for payment." Id., quoting Morse, supra, at § 322. It follows, Morse stated, 
"that this demand for payment is an integral and essential part of the undertaking, and it 
may be said even of the debt itself." Id. 
In short, the agreement of the bank with the depositor, as distinct and valid as if 
written and executed under the seal of each of the parties, is only to pay upon 
demand. Accordingly, until there has been such demand, and a refusal thereto, or 
until some act of the depositor, or some act of the bank made known to the 
depositor, has dispensed with such demand and refusal, the statute ought not to 
begin to run, nor should any presumption of payment be allowed to arise. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 578 ("'[The bank] becomes a mere custodian, and is 
not in default or liable to respond in damages until demand has been made and payment 
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refused. . . . Hence it follows that no right of action exists, and the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until the demand stipulated for in the contract has been duly made. 
For this authorities are hardly necessary.' The great weight of authority runs the same 
way") (citations omitted). 
The Oregon Supreme Court has made the same observation, stating: "The relation 
of a bank and its depositor is that of an ordinary debtor and creditor, except that by 
custom the bank is only liable upon demand made at its place of business." Nodine v. 
First National Bank of Union, 41 Or. 386, 68 P. 1109, 1111 (1902) (emphasis added). 
See also 10 Am.Jur.2d Banks and Financial Institutions § 769 ("[A] contract arises from 
implication of law from a general deposit of funds in a bank that the bank will, whenever 
properly demanded, pay the funds in such sums and to such persons as the depositor shall 
direct and designate") (emphasis added). 
In sum: 
For debt though it be of the bank to the depositor, it is not such naked debt that it 
can be sued upon by the depositor at any moment. The authorities are numerous 
and overwhelming that the depositor's right of action does not come into existence 
until after he has made a demand upon the bank, which there was an implied and 
valid understanding between them in the outset that he should make . . . . The 
duties of demand and of payment are reciprocal. Surely then the legal results of 
these rights should be reciprocal likewise. If the depositor cannot sue till he has 
demanded payment, e converso he should not lose his right to sue till the payment 
has been refused; for until that time he has a right to suppose that the original 
agreement between himself and the bank, which was entered into for their mutual 
advantage and profit, and from which his refraining from demand is enabling the 
bank to reap an unusually great advantage and large profit, is still subsisting in 
unbroken force. 
Morse, § 322(e), pp. 601-02. See also Penagos, supra, 766 So.2d at 1090-91 ("clear 
majority view" that cause of action does not arise on deposit accounts until demand); Arlt, 
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supra, 572 N.E.2d at 1118 ("Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued when they demanded and 
defendant refused to pay them the monies evidenced in the passbook"). 
The United States Supreme Court articulated these same basic concepts in United 
States v. Wardwell, 172 U. S. 48, 19 S.Ct. 86 (1898). In that case, the plaintiff sued to 
recover on three warrants issued by the government to her decedent 24 years earlier that 
had never been redeemed. The Treasury refused to pay on the warrants, arguing that the 
statute of limitations had run. 
The Supreme Court rejected the Treasury's argument, noting that (like savings 
accounts), the money had been initially entrusted to the government "for the benefit of the 
owner until such time as he shall call for it. This is a continuing promise." Id. at 52. 
Absent authority directly on point, the court looked to the law of bank deposits. It first 
observed that, under principles of banking law, "[t]he contract to be implied from the 
usual course of the business is that the banker shall keep the money until it is called for. 
Although it is not strictly a bailment, it partakes in some degree of that character." Id. at 
54. See also Real Good Food Store, Inc. v. First National Bank of Oregon, 276 Or. 1057, 
557 P.2d 654 (1976) (banks are "bailees" of money deposited with them). 
The Supreme Court then noted that, because the "debt" associated with a bank 
deposit does not mature until a demand for payment has been made, "the statute [of 
limitations] ought not to begin to run, nor should any presumption of payment be allowed 
to arise," until such a demand is made. Id. at 55 (emphasis added), quoting Morse, supra. 
Continuing its analogy, the court said that a bank deposit is unlike an ordinary debt in this 
key respect: 
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[T]he liability assumed by receiving a deposit is to pay when actual demand shall 
be made. The engagement of a bank with its depositor is not to pay absolutely and 
immediately, but when payment shall be required at the banking house. It becomes 
a mere custodian, and is not in default or liable to respond in damages until 
demand has been made and payment refused. Such are the terms of the contract 
implied in the transaction of receiving money on deposit, terms necessary alike to 
the depositor and the banker. And it is only because such is the contract that the 
bank is not under the obligation of a common debtor to go after its customer and 
return the deposit wherever he may be found. Hence it follows that no right of 
action exists, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the demand 
stipulated for in the contract has been duly made. 
Id. at 54 (citation omitted). 
The principle that a deposit does not mature as a debt until a demand is made "is 
not inconsistent with the proposition laid down by this court . . . to the effect that the 
relation between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor and creditor, and nothing 
more," the court wrote, "for that proposition throws no light upon the question when the 
debt of the debtor becomes due, and when the statute of limitations begins to run." Id. at 
55. 
In this case, the trial court ruled that the twenty-year presumption of payment 
began to run when the funds were deposited in 1971, even though no demand was made 
until 2003. That is plainly wrong under Oregon law, and the judgment must be reversed. 
B. The presumption of payment does not apply to savings accounts in any 
event. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has indicated that presumptions should apply only 
when doing so is consistent with their rationale. In the matter of savings accounts, 
applying a presumption of payment is neither logical nor consistent with the 
underpinnings and development of the doctrine. 
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"A presumption is an inference which common sense, enlightened by human 
knowledge and experience, draws from the connection, relation, and coincidence of facts 
and circumstances with each other." Dencer v. Jory, 131 Or. 653, 284 P. 163, 165 
(1930), quoting 22 C.J. 82 (ellipse omitted; emphasis added). In Dencer, for example, the 
Oregon Supreme Court recognized that, under that state's law, a presumption of payment 
arises when a defendant has in his possession a promissory note upon which a claim is 
being made. Nonetheless, rather than automatically apply the presumption, the court 
examined the facts surrounding the debt, concluding that its application would not be 
appropriate in that particular case. Id. at 165. See also Thompson v. Larsen, 118 Or. 421, 
247 P. 139, 141 (1926) (one reason that presumption of payment would not apply was 
that debtor was plaintiffs brother-in-law "and he thought he could get his money any 
time"; indulgence of a creditor under such circumstances "is not unusual"). 
Normal societal expectations are for customers to be able to leave money in 
savings accounts for long periods of time without having to worry about losing it, 
especially when this account was opened in 1971. It is illogical to apply a presumption of 
payment under such circumstances. Historical understanding of the presumption does not 
support its application "unless the forbearance be unusual, or contrary to what might have 
been expected." Kirk v. Smith ex dem. Penn, 22 U. S. 241, 254, 9 Wheat. 241 (1824). 
For example, no common law presumption of payment arose in Penn, the court said, 
because "it ha[d] been the universal practice to forbear." Id. 
It is likewise the "universal practice" to leave money in a savings account for 
indefinite periods of time until a demand is made, and no presumption of payment should 
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apply to such accounts. In Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 143 NJ. 220, 760 A.2d 509 
(1996), one of the more recent cases to involve a passbook account, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In Pagano, Rose Guarina deposited 
$4,400.00 into the defendant bank's predecessor in 1970, and received a passbook in her 
name reflecting the deposit. After Guarina5 s death in 1990, her daughter, Linda Pagano, 
discovered the passbook in a dresser drawer. There were no transactions other than the 
initial deposit. The bank refused payment, stating that it had no record of the account, 
and that the account was presumed paid after 20 years. 
The court characterized the issue raised on appeal as "whether the common law 
rebuttable presumption of payment after the lapse of twenty years year should be applied 
to a passbook-savings account when the issuing bank has no record of the account and 
has never stamped or otherwise marked the passbook canceled or closed." Id. at 510. In 
answering that question, the court first noted that the presumption of payment is of 
decreasing vitality in modem times. Id. at 513-14 ("the common-law presumption of 
payment is not being applied even in matters in which it was applied historically"), citing 
Wigmore on Evidence § 2517. (It had not been applied in New Jersey since 1939. Most 
of Oregon's presumption of payment cases are likewise quite musty.)4 
The presumption was not historically applied to bank accounts, the Court further 
noted: 
Also citing Wigmore, the Oregon Supreme Court noted courts' declining reliance on the 
presumption of payment more than 80 years ago. Thompson v. Larsen, 118 Or. 421, 247 
P. 139 (1926), quoting 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 2517, p. 3565. 
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As Wigmore, supra, § 2517 suggests, and decisional law supports, the common-
law presumption of payment was not generally recognized in the area of banking. 
When the presumption was applied in the earlier cases, banks seldom prevailed 
unless they had records to support the claim of payment. Thus when applied, the 
presumption did not obviate the need for record retention because a demand for 
payment on an old account was frequently supported by reasonable explanations 
for the delay. 
M a t 514. 
Moreover, the presumption of payment "has always been applied by analogy to the 
limitations statute," the court noted, and causes of action on deposit accounts for 
limitations purposes do not accrue until a demand for payment has been made. Id. at 514. 
In light of all the considerations, the court held that the presumption of payment does not 
apply to savings accounts.5 
The New Jersey Supreme Court had little sympathy for the bank defendant's 
complaint that it had chosen to destroy all of its passbook account records, as a result of 
which the claim was difficult to defend. Such claims lack muster, the court said, 
especially in the days of computerization: 
Before the age of computers, banks could have established and retained a record, if 
nothing more than a log book, showing how it closed a passbook-savings account 
when a notation to that effect was not placed in the original passbook. Now, 
modem technology has made the storage of vast amounts of information at low 
cost a common reality. 
5
 Significantly, there are no cases in Oregon applying the presumption of payment to 
bank accounts. See, e.g., Beekman /, supra (unpaid judgment); City of Pendleton v. 
Holman, 177 Or. 532, 164 P.2d 434 (1945) (assessment by city for work done); Mason v. 
Mason, 148 Or. 34, 34 P.2d 328 (1934) (divorce decree); Wood v. Davin, 122 Or. 74, 257 
P. 690 (1927) (contract for sale of land). None of the 19 cases cited in Beekman /, the 
case in which Oregon adopted the presumption of payment, involved a bank account. 
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M a t 514. 
The decision to destroy computer (or microfiche) records is a deliberate choice, the 
consequences of which a bank must accept: 
We agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that even if the lack of bank records 
is caused by adherence to established record-retention standards, the absence of 
records does not constitute evidence of payment. Wool [v. Nations bank of Virginia, 
248 Va. 384, 448 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1994)]. Furthermore, no statutes, regulations 
or decisional law exempted UJB from retaining records to establish payment. It 
was a conscious economic decision made by the bank to shift its resources away 
from record retention. That may or may not be a sound business judgment, but 
clearly it is insufficient to justify the remedy UJB seeks from this Court. 
Id See also Abraham v. National City Bank Corp., 553 N.E. 2d 619, 621 (Ohio 1990) 
(opining that "a bank would be foolish to destroy its records" and "leave itself open to 
litigation without the documents to defend itself unless it were protected by a statute like 
Ohio's that expressly bars subsequent litigation). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Pagano has been cited by leading 
authorities as correctly stating the law relating to the presumption of payment in the 
context of savings accounts. See 9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 276 ("A rebuttable 
presumption of payment, arising from a lapse of twenty years from the date of accrual of 
the debt, does not apply to savings accounts"); Michie, supra, § 368c, p. 705 ("A 
rebuttable presumption of payment, arising from a lapse of twenty years from the date of 
accrual of a debt, if a viable presumption at all, does not apply to savings accounts").6 
6
 The Oregon Supreme Court would likely consider Michie on Banks and Banking to be 
persuasive authority. It has cited Michie as authoritative on banking law in at least 27 
cases. See, e.g., Modoc Meat & Cattle Co. v. First State Bank of Oregon, 271 Or. 276, 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PRESUMPTION HAD NOT BEEN REBUTTED. 
In Oregon, "the presumption [of payment] is rebutted, or, to speak more 
accurately, does not arise, where there is affirmative proof, beyond that furnished by the 
specialty itself, that the debt has not been paid, or where there are circumstances that 
sufficiently account for the delay of the creditor." Beekman II, 25 P. at 672. Even if the 
presumption had been applicable, sufficient proof was adduced here. 
Evidence that the "debt" had not been paid included: 
[T]he passbook shows the deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require 
presentation of the passbook. "George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name 
appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has not made any withdrawals and has not 
authorized any other person to make withdrawals. 
(R. 251.) It was also uncontroverted that Mr. Handy did not execute a lost-passbook 
affidavit. (T. 26-27, lines 25-5.) 
This evidence is similar to that adduced in Central National Bank of McKinney, 
557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. - 1977). In that case, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals 
was faced with a presumption of payment defense on a claim for a passbook savings 
account. The court summarized the plaintiffs evidence: 
The passbook involved in this cause was issued to the plaintiff and had been in the 
possession of plaintiff since it was issued and delivered to her in 1932, showing an 
initial deposit of $1,000. The plaintiff did not make any additional deposits, did 
not make any withdrawals, did not authorize anyone else to make withdrawals, and 
was never contacted by the Bank concerning the account. Plaintiff made demand 
532 P.2d 21, 25 (1975); U. S. National Bank of Portland v. Stonebrink, 200 Or. 176, 265 
P.2d 238, 254 (1954); First National Bank of Portland v. Connolly, 172 Or. 434, 138 P.2d 
613,622(1943). 
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on defendant Bank for the proceeds of the account in February 1975 (43 years 
later). 
Finding in favor of the plaintiff, the court stated: 
Under the findings of the trial court that plaintiff made no withdrawals, did not 
authorize anyone to make withdrawals, made no affidavit of lost passbook, and did 
not receive payment of such account, we are of the opinion that any presumption 
was rebutted so as to defeat such presumption. A presumption of law, as such, is 
not in the nature of evidence and has no probative force, and that when some 
evidence of probative nature has been introduced tending to overcome the 
presumption, it disappears entirely from the case. 
Id. at 565 (citations omitted). 
anyone else to do so was uncontroverted. Although it was theoretically possible for 
someone to ha\<- withdrawn the funds without the passbook, ^^ -vnuld have been 
i i! icon in IOI l .
 :. . . .M.i: <v si%ge-: ; , • n 
one person might have been able to sign for a withdrawal, would also have been unusual, 
because ordinarily the names of all authorized signers were written on the passbook. Id, 
hypothetical scenarios that its own employees testified would have been unusual. I Jnder 
these circumstances, and because the Bank's only "evidence" was a presumption, the trial 




For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court, and to remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, with damages to be determined. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the lit day of October, 2006, two true and correct copies 
of icregoing BRIEF 
Michael W. Homer 
Kevin D. Swenson 
Bret S. Hayman 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Kslrra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHll •-; ; v Memorandum Decision, March 2i n 
EXHIBIT B Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, May 1, 2006 
EXHli . 0 Passbook (11 ial Exhibit 1) 
EXlI.15i i A 
j . o M ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER C < M INTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE B. HANDY, Trustee,1"1"1 ' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U.S . BANK HA 1 ll INAI A.SS'N., 
Defendant. 
1 A R - 1 
1:1 cuurvi mr> "•*-'hh 
P 3= U8 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 040901807 
Judge W. Brent West 
^ J, < % 
ntiff, George H j unuv. lound a passbook in his credenza in October, 2003. 
This passbook shows five deposits made between July 24 and September 14, 1971 
total inr % '• "'• ,!' "• •••'•••- ••sted on the passbook is "George B. I landy, 
Trustee." The passbook states that it "must be presented when a withdrawal is made." 
This passbook shows no withdrawals. Mr. Handy has no idea how this paiI :iilai 
passbook came to rest in his credenza and does not know who opened the account or 
made the deposits. Plaintiff promptly contacted the Defendant, U.S. Bank National 
As.i(ii ! !" ' ".! ; ; ' . / 'n;:;.. !\i':.:*.- Mr. --'aic^ AdUvMUi Sank of 
Oregon. Defendant has no record of the account, its depositor, or of its closure. As the 
Plaintiff testified, the on.LMI;^  :.•..• t =.. ; <.*"• ••* -^^.a,.^ .^ .»• 
Plaintiff, acting as trustee, seeks to recover the principal shown in the passbook along 
with the accumulated interest. The Court held trial on February 6, 2005. At trial, Prestoii 
I landy appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and Kevin Swenson on behalf of the 




1. Defendant's Affirmative Defenses: Escheat and Laches. 
Defendant argues that any money in the account would have escheated to the 
state. Under Oregon's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, any deposit with 
a bank "is presumed abandoned" unless the owner has taken some action within five 
years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 98.308(1) (2003).l Deposits that are presumed abandoned may be 
subject to the custody of the State of Oregon. Id. at § 98.304. Escheat would be an 
affirmative defense for the Defendant. However, the only evidence at trial was that this 
account did not escheat to either Oregon or Utah. The fact that the account could have 
escheated or even that it was required to escheat is not sufficient proof that it in fact did 
escheat. The Court finds that there is no evidence of escheat and concludes that the 
Defendant has not met its burden on this affirmative defense. 
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. 
This affirmative defense requires Defendant to show that (1) Plaintiff delayed asserting 
his claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all the relevant 
facts, (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to the Defendant that it would be 
inequitable for the Court to grant Plaintiff relief. Bruns v. Walters, 28 P.3d 646 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2001). The time begins to run on the Plaintiffs claim when Plaintiff "knew or 
reasonably should have known he had an interest which was being threatened." Id. The 
Defendant, as the party asserting laches, "has the burden of demonstrating that each 
element exists." Myers v. Weems, 876 P.2d 861, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). In this case, 
Plaintiff discovered the passbook in October of 2003 and promptly took steps to recover 
its stated funds. Plaintiff learned that his interest in the account was being threatened 
1
 The parties agree that because this account was opened in Oregon, Oregon law should apply. There does 
not appear to be any significant difference between the relevant Oregon and Utah laws. However, where 





when the Defendant refused to make payment. The Defendant had the burden to 
establish, if possible, some fact or circumstance that would have placed Mr. Handy on 
constructive notice that the funds were being threatened sooner than October, 2003. 
Defendant has not made that required showing. The Defendant has not proven that 
Plaintiff was placed on constructive notice and, therefore, has n.-; .ui UN t ..men to bar 
Plaintiff s claim under laches. 
2 ' d. 
After twenty years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid. Beekman v. 
Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891). The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to 
bank deposits. Hicks v. Exck Bank & Trust Co., 478 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1972); Long v. 
Straus, 24 N.E. 664 (Ind. 1890); Morse v. Natl Cent. Bank, 132 A. 598 (Md. 1926); 
Boscowitz v. Chase Nat 7 , o2); Second Nat / Bank v. 
Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910); Commerce Union Bank v. Horton, 475 S.W.2d 660 
(Term. 1972); Blackstone v. First Nt it 7 B« it ik 192 P - V< it 7 
Bank ofMcKinney, Texas v. Booher, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Owens v. 
Bank ofBrewton, 302 So. 2d 114 (Ala. App. 1974); In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111. 
App. Ct. 1989); (I \ u )/ I \ NationsbankofVa., N. 4., 448 S.E.2d613 (Va 1994),,, But see 
Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 670 A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995) (refusing to extend the 
between July 24 and September 14, 1971. Plaintiff had not taken any action on this 
account until December 2003—a period of 32 years. Accoi dingly, the Coi n t presi n lies 




As a plaintiff, Mr. Handy has the burden to prove his claim, including the 
existence of the debt, by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the presumption 
of payment from lapse of time, having arisen, places the burden on the Plaintiff to show 
that the debt has not been paid.2 Beekman v. Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891); see 69 
A.L.R.3d 1311 (1995) (explaining that the common law presumption is an evidentiary 
rule placing the burden on the party seeking to recover the debt). The Plaintiff must 
show "by competent evidence that the debt . . . has not been paid." Beekman, 25 P. at 
672 (requiring plaintiff "to show by something more than his bond that the debt has not 
been paid"). The presumption "is a strong one [and] the evidence to rebut it must be 
satisfactory and convincing. . . ." Id. at 673. In this case, the passbook shows the 
deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require presentation of the passbook. 
"George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has 
not made any withdrawals and has not authorized any other person to make withdrawals. 
There is no other competent evidence that these deposits have not been paid. 
Other courts have considered claims to collect deposits presumed paid by lapse of 
time, with some allowing recovery and some holding for the bank. See 69 A.L.R.3d 1311 
at §§ 4, 5 (1995). In the majority of cases allowing plaintiffs to recover deposits, the 
plaintiff was the depositor and had personal knowledge regarding the opening of the 
account. See Cent. Bank ofMcKinney, Texas v. Boohev, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App. 
1977) (allowing depositor to recover balances shown on a passbook issued to her after 
2
 Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs claim was barred by the presumption of 
payment. The Court denied Defendant's motion noting that the passbook was some evidence of 
nonpayment. As a motion for summary judgment, the Court viewed that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. In denying Defendant's motion, the Court did not grant summary 
judgment on that issue to the Plaintiff, who had not filed a summary judgment motion of his own. Having 
now heard the evidence regarding the passbook, the bank's practices, and the extent of Plaintiff s 




43 years where depositor testified that she made no withdrawals); Second Natl Bank v. 
Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910) (finding that the presumption was overvorr.. - k>?v 
the defendant depositor and his wife testified "emphatically" that they had not been paid). 
Among the cases finding the evidence insufficient to recover on a deposit after 20 years, 
t .->•'* ' ,!' • {'. i »v . ;ie deposits and did not set up the 
account. See In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that plaintiff 
who discovei ed I ler late hi isband's passbo* : .' • • ears atk' -. ,:*•• i .•-.. i -r. . t 
presented sufficient evidence where plaintiff knew almost nothing regarding her 
husband's financial affairs or of the account in question); Owens v Bi ink of Bre i vtt m, 302 
So. 2c ; ; * (Ala. App. 1974) (holding that the executor of the account owner, who had no 
knowledge of the account other than the information contained in the passbook, had 
presented in iiillk ieiil e\ iik'iiecl. 
In this case, Plaintiff does not know who opened the account. Plaintiff does not 
know who minU ilio deposits n? lioiv die passbook came min his possessing I I pi MI 
opening an account, the bank required its customers to fill out a signature card, A 
customer could put different, or more, names on the signature card iv \- * r ^<^<^k. 
A properly authorized person could also withdraw money without the passbook if his 
name appeared on the signature card. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court knows whose 
JIV**' ' ' l ' ' c > l ; i na l 1 ; " :t :
 t „ . , , , , ; ^ ; . „ ; 
Bank of Oregon did away with its passbooks. All passbook accounts converted to 
statement savings accounts. After the conversion n;i^ho<a :v<- ,-M - . » : ' ie 
bank told customers to throw their passbooks away. The bank even handed extra 
passbooks out to children at schools. After that conversion, the owner of t'»i« < -nt 
Memorandum Decision 
no. 040901807 
could have withdrawn from the account without the passbook. Neither the Plaintiff nor 
the Court knows who else was authorized on the signature card. This would be a very 
different case if the Plaintiff had opened the account himself. As is, the Plaintiffs 
testimony that he did not authorize any other person to withdraw from the account is 
severely discounted by the fact that Plaintiff does not know who created the account or 
who else the account owner might have authorized on the signature card. The Court finds 
that Plaintiff has not met the burden imposed on him to show that this account has not 
been paid. 
3. Plaintiff as Trustee. 
The name on the passbook is "George B. Handy, Trustee." Although not 
dispositive in this case, the Court believes that the status of this "trust" merits attention. 
Creating a trust requires more than using the word "trust." One requirement to create a 
trust is to have an ascertainable beneficiary. Agan v. United States Nat'I Bank, 363 P.2d 
765 (Or. 1961); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112. Another requirement is that the 
settlor impose some affirmative duties on the trustee. Lee v. Me/one, 527 P.2d 414 (Or. 
1974); Phillips v. Dep 't of Revenue, 6 Or. Tax. 157 (1975). A trust that imposes no 
duties on the trustee is considered "dry." Id. A dry trust fails and the property passes to 
the intended beneficiary outright. Id. When a trust fails, the grantee holds the property 
under a resulting trust for the benefit of the grantor or the grantor's estate. Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts §411. In this case, there is no trust document other than the passbook 
itself. Plaintiff does not know who the settlor was, although there is speculation. There 
are no ascertainable beneficiaries and the passbook does not impose any affirmative 





The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show by 
satisfactory evidence that the debt has not been paid. The Court finds in favor of the 
Defendant I Ir. Swenson will please prepare the appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
Dated tllis {V- day of March, 2006. 
W. Brent West, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
v /o 
I hereby certify that on the / day of March, 2006,1 sent a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing memorandum decision to counsel as follows: 
Michael W. Homer 
Kevin D. Swenson 
Bret S. Hay man 
Counsel for Defendant 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
George B. Handy 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suit; 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Preston L. Handy 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
5604 South Green Street 







SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
2 0 0 6 H A Y - I AMI0« UU 
Michael W. Homer (#1535) 
Kevin D. Swenson (#5803) 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 j p Y 0 1 2006 
Facsimile: (801)532-7355 
Attorneys for Defendant U.S. Bank National Association 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE B. HANDY, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 040901807 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter came before the court for a bench trial on February 6, 2006. Plaintiff was 
represented by Preston L. Handy of Siegfried & Jensen, and defendant was represented by Kevin 
D. Swenson of Suitter Axland, PLLC. The court having reviewed the pleadings and testimony, 
heard argument in the matter, and hearing the testimony of witnesses at trial, makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
: FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW S 
VD18994524 
040901807 US BANK NATIONAL ASSOC 
0 
•*' FINDINGS OF F A C T 
1. Plaintiff, George B. Handy, found a passbook issued by the United States National 
Bank of Oregon in his credenza in October 2003. 
2. Prior to October 2003, plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the passbook. 
3. The passbook was identified as Account Number 403111-8 (the "Passbook"). 
4. The Passbook showed five (5) deposits made between July 24 and September 14, 
1971. 
5. The five (5) deposits totaled $150,000. 
6. The Passbook had George B. Handy, Trustee, written on it. 
7. Plaintiff did not know who wrote the name on the Passbook. 
8. The Passbook showed no withdrawals. 
9. Plaintiff had no idea how the Passbook came to rest in his credenza. 
10. Plaintiff did not know who opened Account Number 403111-8 (the "Account") or 
who made the deposits that were shown in the Passbook. 
11. Prior to August 1971, a client of plaintiff had asked if he could put money in 
plaintiffs trust account, or a trust account in his name. 
12. Plaintiffdid not make the deposits into the Account. 
13. Plaintiff did not open the Account. 
14. Defendant had no record of this Account. 
15. Plaintiffdid not know who was authorized to take money out of the Account. 
259 
5? 
16. The express terms of the Passbook required the presentation of the Passbook for 
withdrawals. 
17. A Signature Card is required to open every Account. 
18. Plaintiff did not sign a Signature Card for the Account. 
19. There is no evidence that the Account escheated to any State. 
20. Plaintiff did not take any action on this matter until December 2003. 
21. In the Fall of 1980, the United States National Bank of Oregon did away with its 
passbook accounts. All passbook accounts were converted to statement savings accounts. 
22. Plaintiff did not receive notice of the change to statement savings accounts. 
23. Plaintiff did not receive any correspondence from defendant regarding the 
Account. 
24. Defendant did not have any records of the Account. 
25. After the conversion to statement savings accounts, passbooks became worthless. 
26. After the conversion to statement savings accounts, bank representatives told 
customers they could throw their passbooks away. 
27. Plaintiff presented no evidence of a trust having in fact been created with regard 
to this Passbook Account. 
28. There was no ascertainable beneficiary identified for the alleged trust associated 
with the Passbook Account. 
260 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant did not meet his burden of proof on the affirmative defense that the 
funds in the Passbook had escheated to any State. 
2. Defendant did not meet his burden of proof that the plaintiff had been on 
constructive notice prior to October 2003 regarding the existence of the Passbook; therefore, it 
did not meet his burden that plaintiffs claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. 
3. Based on Oregon law, after 20 years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid. 
4. The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to bank deposits. 
5» The court finds that there is a presumption that the defendant has paid the 
deposits. 
6. Plaintiff has the burden to prove his claim, including the existence of the debt, by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
7. Plaintiff has the burden to show that the debt has not been paid. 
$. Plaintiff must make this showing that the debt has been paid "by competent 
evidence that the debt . . . has not been paid." 
9. Plaintiff had no evidence other than his own testimony that he did not withdraw 
the money or authorize anyone else to withdraw the money to show that the deposits had not 
been paid. 
10. Plaintiff did not meet the burden imposed upon him to show that this Account has 
not been paid. 
4 
11. The court finds that because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in his case, his 
claim must fail. 
12. Judgment in this matter is for the defendant, finding no cause of action. 
13. Plaintiff filed a request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56. Section 78-27-56 allows for attorneys' fees to a prevailing party if the "court determines that 
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." 
14. In this case, plaintiff was not the prevailing party and there is no showing that the 
defense was brought in bad faith, as shown by the fact that the defendant was the prevailing party 
in this case. 
15. Plaintiffs motions for attorneys' fees are accordingly denied. 
DATED this 2S~ day of April, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND«£QNTENT: /? 





* CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^LO day of April, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be deposited in the 
United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Preston L. Handy, Esq. 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
George B. Handy, Attorney 















HEAD OFFICE • PORTLAND 
N © T l p E 
It is not necessary to bring your pass 
book on interest payment dates for 
the entry of interest. Interest has been 
added to your account on our books 
by these dates and can be entered in 
your pass book at any time thereafter. 
United States National Bank of Oregon 













For your protection, all with-
drawals from this account require 
presentation ot the passbook. Please 
notify us at once should you lose 
your passbook. 
Your signature is important. Be 
sure to sign your name each time just as you did in opening the 
account. 
Please notify us of any change 
of address. 
It is not necessary to bring in 
your passbook on the first of each 
quarter for the entry of interest. 
We credit your account automatic-
ally with your interest on these 
dates and it can be entered in your 






HEAD OFFICE • PORTLAND 
HEAD OFFICE 
S . W . B R O A D W A Y A N D S I X T H 
A T S T A R K S T . 
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
R U L E S A N D R E G U L A T I O N S GOVERN-
ING SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
DEPOSITOR AND BANK AGREE: 
Rule 1. All savings deposits are received 
by United States National Bank of Oregon 
subject to rules and regulations as printed 
herein; as shown on Bank's deposit and 
other forms; and as changed from time , 
to time by posting of notice in Bank's lobby. 
.Acceptance of this passbook, and inscription 
pf name 'by depositor or agent oh signature ; 
card required by the Bank, shall be deemed 
and held to be a valid assent thereto, 
(THE SAVINGS PASSBOOK) 
Rule 2. A pre-numbered passbook shall be 
issued for each savings account. All deposits 
made by or for the account of the depositor 
will be entered in the passbook at the time 
they are made, or as soon thereafter as the 
passbbojc shall>Jb^ presented:^fbr such pur-
pose. The balance shown in the passbook to 
the credit 62 the depositor is subject to cor-
rection to accord with the Bank's records. 
Should the savings passbook be lost, de-
stroyed orfraudulently obtained from any 
depositor, immediate notice must be given 
the Office of the Bank at which the account 
is carried. After such notice, if satisfactory 
explanation be made and bond Of indemnity 
be given in a form approved by the Bank's 
6ffleers, the amount to the credit of the 
depositor will be paid to such depositor, or 
anew book will be issued therefor. 
J (ASSIGNMElSfrT OF ACCOUNT) 
Rule 3. No assignment of the depositor's 
i passbook or account, or any part thereof, | shall be Valid unless made in writing, aha 
shall not bind the Bank until it has been 
1 filed with the Bank in writing. 
(DEPOSITS) 
J Rule 4. Deposits will be received of any 
sum from one dollar to such maximum J amount as may from time to time be desig-
I nated by the Bank. .•; • 
I Items are credited conditionally at time of 
I deposit and may be forwarded On next busi-
ness date after receipt. Bank may charge J back any item before ultimate payment, in-
\ eluding items drawn on this Bank; it is not 
I liable for losses i i transit; and it may de-
I cline to honor withdrawals against condi-j tional credits. Depositor is bound by all 
clearing house and/or Federal Reserve col-
I lection rules and practices. 
1 The Bank may decline to receive any de-
l posit and at any time may require depositor 
/: to withdrav/ all or part of the funds on }' deposit. Notice thereof will be mailed to the 
I depositor by first class mail at his last ad-
K dress on file with the Bank. Interest shall 
I cease pii such dep >sit or part of deposit for } Which withdrawal Is required after5 thirty 
f days frbm date of such notice. 
j (DEPOSITS P F MINORS) 
1 Rule 5. Deposits made by any person or 
1 persons for or in the name of any minor 




/ ' UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK OF OREGON IN ACCOUNT WITH .
 A r t J . - ^ 
NO 403111^ 
such deposit or part thereof only upon the 
written order of the minor. 
Deposits made by any person or persons 
In trust for any minor shall be made and 
received upon the express condition that 
the Bank during the lifetime of the deposi-
tor may pay out such deposit or part there-
of only upon the written order of the 
person or persons who made the deposit in 
trust for the minor. 
(WITHDRAWALS) 
Rule 6. The passbook must be presented 
to the Bank when a withdrawal is made. 
Withdrawals may be made personally, the 
depositor being required to sign a receipt 
for the amount of the withdrawal, or by 
order in writing satisfactorily authenticated, 
or by power of attorney, duly authenticated. 
It is understood and agreed that the Bank 
may require, whenever in the opinion of 
any of the officers, it may be deemed advis-
able, written notices of the intention of any 
depositor to withdraw as follows: 
Thirty days' notice to withdraw any 
sum up to $100; sixty days* notice to 
withdraw any sum from $100 to $500; 
ninety days' notice to withdraw any 
sum from $500 to $1,000; four months' 
notice td withdraw any sum from $1,000 
to $3,000; six months' notice to with-
draw any sum over $3,000. 
A second notice of withdrawal will not be 
accepted until the first notice has expired 
or been cancelled. Failure to demand pay-
ment at the Bank within five days after the 
expiration of the notice shall be constituted 
a waiver of such notice arid a new notice 
may be required. 
(INTEREST) 
Rule 7. Interest will be allowed and paid 
on savings' accounts on such terms and con-
ditions and at such rates and on such bal-
: ances as may, from time to time be desig-
\ nated by the Banfc or is limited by the 
i Federal Reserve Board oi other legally con-
* stituted authority. . . . 
L (SERVICE CHARGES) 
I Rule 8. All savings accounts, whether ac-J, tive or inactive, shall be subject to service 
' charges now or hereafter in effect. 
i (AMENDMENTS) 
!
 Rule 9. These rules, conditions and regu-
» lations may be altered or amended, ,and 
t new ones made by the Sank at any time, 
I but no alterations or ariendments or new 
l rules, regulations or conditions shall be in 
v
f force until notice thereof shall have been | posted in the Bank lobby for at least thirty 






U. S. NATIONAL 
SERVICES 
Complete Trust Service 
Checking Accounts 
Safe Deposit Boxes . 
International Banking Department 
Collection Service 
Travelers Cheques 
Personal and Business Loans \ 
Christmas Club 
Bank Drafts and Money Orders 
Bank by Mail 
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